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Schengen and the Rosary: Catholic Religion 
and the Postcolonial Syndrome in 
Polish National Habitus 
Marta Bucholc ∗ 
Abstract: »Schengen und der Rosenkranz: Katholische Religion und das postko-
loniale Syndrom im polnischen Nationalhabitus«. The article discusses the for-
mation of national habitus in Poland and its recent transformation in the post-
socialist period from the perspective of Norbert Elias’s sociology of social pro-
cesses. The starting point of the analysis is the action “Rosary to the Borders” 
(Różaniec do granic) of 2017: the article analyses the use of universal Catholic 
and nation-bound symbolic resources in this action referring to Elias’s symbol 
theory, in order to indicate the main characteristics of the mechanism of col-
lective memory in this action connecting Catholic symbols to the national ones. 
Religious imagery of Polishness is then related to a reconstruction of Polish 
state-formation process, and two uses of national habitus, the internal and the 
external one, are identified, in which religious symbols play a significant role. 
The external use is illustrated by the brief overview of German-Polish antago-
nism. Finally, the postcolonial syndrome of Polis society is identified as source 
of the framing combining external and internal use of Polish national habitus, 
especially after 2015.   
Keywords: Poland, national habitus, postcolonial studies, Norbert Elias,  
Catholicism, collective memory. 
1. Introduction 
On 7 October 2017, over a million people in Poland took part in an action 
called “Rosary to the Borders” (Polish: Różaniec do granic). Along all the 
borders of Poland (over 3,500 km in length, including the borders running 
along or over waterways) the participants gathered to pray the rosary together.
1
 
This was reported to be the largest mass prayer event in Europe since the 2016 
World Youth Day in Kraków, Poland.  
                                                             
∗
  Marta Bucholc, Käte Hamburger Kolleg „Recht als Kultur,” University of Bonn/University of 
Warsaw, Konrad-Zuse-Platz 1-3, 53227 Bonn, Germany; mbucholc@uni-bonn.de. 
1  
Source: the action’s official webpage, <http://www.rozaniecdogranic.pl/o-rozancu-do-
granic> [16.07.18]. Other media sources confirm the number of participants. 
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The paradox which struck me when I first heard of the action was that it 
stressed the existence of state borders which had been, for the most part, ren-
dered socially invisible by the Schengen Agreement of 1985 (which included 
Poland from 2007). The border is no longer a conspicuous line within the EU. 
It was not abolished, but it was cognitively deactivated: easily overlooked 
physical remnants remind Polish EU-citizens that they are about to cross the 
Western, Southern, Northern, and, in part, also the Eastern border of their 
country. “Rosary to the Borders” used a rite to restore the borders as division 
lines by aggregating social action along them. At the very first glance, it 
seemed a negation of the negated, an apotropaic denial of non-existence, a 
religious actus contrarius to the act of political unification.  
In this article, I take “Rosary to the Borders” as a starting point for an histor-
ical-sociological analysis of Polish national habitus, in order better to under-
stand why such an action would be happening now. Recent political events in 
Poland have won the land increased attention internationally, an almost satiri-
cal reminder of the glorious times of “Solidarność” in the 1980s. Poland was 
the vanguard of democratization then and, since 2015, it has replaced Hungary 
as the lead country in Central and Eastern Europe experiencing democratic 
backsliding. The Polish variant of democratic backsliding is fueled by the ex-
press commitment of the current right-wing Polish government, especially the 
Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, “PiS”) to the Catholic religion 
as a foundation of national identity. After 2015, the apparent failure of the post-
socialist liberal transformation process increased interest in the social and cul-
tural dynamic behind political, economic, and legal change. However, the 
historical perspective stretching back beyond 1989 remains marginal to social 
scientific inquiry, and a comprehensive study of the cultural underpinnings of 
political developments remains a task for the future. This is due, in part, to a 
lack of an interdisciplinary theoretical framework allowing the combination of 
sociological and historical perspectives with an interpretation of cultural pro-
cesses.  
The focus on national habitus, or, more precisely, on the national layer in 
the social habitus (it is with this meaning that I use the notion “national habi-
tus” throughout this paper; see Kuzmics and Axtmann 2007, 11), can support 
our understanding of current developments, while at the same time contributing 
to a further elaboration of theoretical approaches inspired by Norbert Elias. 
Elias himself applied his theory of national habitus mostly to Germany (Elias 
2013). His analysis, combining social and cultural history with a deep insight 
into social mechanisms generating what could be called “Germanness,” may 
serve as a model for those seeking to grasp other national “-nesses” while 
avoiding the trap of essentialism. Two safeguards against essentialism are 
inherent in the use of the concept of national habitus. The first is a focus on the 
historical genesis of any national group, the second is the contingent relation-
ship of group characteristics to the interdependencies within the group as well 
HSR 45 (2020) 1  │  155 
as connections to other groups, notably to neighbours. I will refer to the social 
carrier of a national habitus as a “national group.” While in European history it 
will usually be co-extensive with a state-society of a modern nation-state, this 
need not always be the case, as shown by Helmut Kuzmics and Roland Ax-
tmann in the case of imperial Austria and England. Therefore, it is more useful 
to reason in terms of layers and to keep in mind that research into national 
habitus is not about what nations are but about what and how they are being 
made (or unmade).  
“Polishness” is, therefore, not a free-standing historical entity. Neither is it a 
cultural epiphenomenon of social processes: it cannot be explained away by a 
precise historical reconstruction. Moreover, the “Polishness” which expresses 
itself in “Rosary to the borders,” is not the only cultural outcome of historical 
process which led to the formation of current Polish state-society. While Elias 
analyzed a single German national habitus (though, admittedly, a contested 
one), there is no single Polish habitus, but rather a battlefield between various 
projects of national habitus for a state-society which has been undergoing a 
deep transformation for more than 200 years. On this battlefield, the habitus 
metonymized by the “Rosary to the Borders” seems to come up as a winner, to 
dominate and to take the upper hand in the management, generation and mobi-
lization of symbolic resources. “Polishness,” as described in this article, is the 
runner-up in a long-standing contest which predates the Polish nation-state. In 
this paper, I dub the current competitors “liberals” and “national conservatives” 
or, simply, “the Right.” The interplay between these two variants of “Polish-
ness” and their respective relation to Catholicism belongs to the socio-historical 
analysis of Polish national habitus just as much as the diagnosis of the out-
come, which may be the unqualified triumph of one contestant and the end of 
Polish cultural wars. 
Cultural war is a metaphor for the contest between various orientations in 
national habitus formation. The orientation nearest to the Right which has 
governed in Poland since 2015 is marked by intensive work on memory. His-
torically loaded symbols are brought back and emotionally charged or re-
charged in a form of an “affective household” consistent with the political 
project of the Right, providing material for politically mobilizable collective 
identity. While the processes of habitus formation are hardly describable in the 
language of purposeful action – because unintended consequences bear upon 
their outcomes at least as much as do decisions, agendas, and designs – it is 
possible to identify actors whose intention it is to transform the society accord-
ing to their own design of a national habitus. My contention is that the Right 
currently advocates a powerful design of Polish national habitus, and that its 
strategy begs for socio-historical research: it is a habitus marked by a variant of 
postcolonial mentality in which the past and the present of the nation is reinter-
preted in terms of dependency, deficient sovereignty, lack of autonomy, and 
limited authenticity of self-expression. 
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To substantiate this claim, I begin with a review of Elias’s insights in sym-
bol theory from the perspective of research into national habitus. Then I pro-
ceed towards an analysis of “Rosary to the Borders,” including symbols, dis-
courses, and practices involved and their historical embedding, based on 
publicly available visual and textual data. I next reconstruct the mnemonic 
transposition of symbols, stressing correspondences between contemporary 
contexts and historical resources. My particular attention goes to the distinction 
between external and internal uses of national habitus design. I look closely 
into those dividing lines which serve the direct goal of cutting off the alterna-
tive habitus project of the “liberals” by using religious symbolic resources and, 
as a result, cutting off the liberals from Polishness. This informs my discussion 
of the postcolonial syndrome, including the uses to which postcolonial studies 
are put today in both scientific and political discourses in Poland. I will ex-
pound the double binds of Polish national habitus design advocated by the 
Right in order to conclude with its potential figurational effects for Poland and 
Europe.  
2.  Symbols and Habitus Formation: Contested Labels and 
Emotional Charges 
The gist of Elias’s symbol theory is contained in two works: An Essay on Time 
(2007a) and The Symbol Theory (2011), although valuable insights can also be 
found elsewhere. Secondary literature on Elias’s symbol theory is growing, but 
inspirations and affinities of his highly original approach still largely remain to 
be identified, despite excellent work done by Stephen Mennell (Elias 2006; 
2007a), Richard Kilminster (Elias 2011), Robert van Krieken (Elias 2010), 
Jason Hughes, Eric Dunning (Dunning, Hughes 2012), and many others. Much 
less can be said of the empirical use of Elias’s symbol theory, despite its signif-
icant research potential, especially in the field of memory studies (see Bucholc 
2013). 
Elias contented himself with a simplistic vision of a symbol as something 
assigned to an object (whether concrete or abstract, existent or fictional) by a 
human collective and applied by individuals. His notion of a symbol becomes a 
vehicle for the idea that humans organize the world around them, imposing an 
arbitrary order onto reality. But instead of values or meanings favored by the 
Neo-Kantian philosophy in which Elias was first trained, he spoke about sym-
bols, and this small difference is a strength of his theory. While values and 
meanings can be described as putting plus and minus signs onto elements of 
reality, symbols are more elementary: they are extracting elements of reality, 
they, so to say, make them appear as something relevant and potentially useful. 
The positive and negative valuations are secondary to the very fact of being 
represented: symbols can be strongly loaded or neutral. This small shift allows 
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sociology to look into two kinds of processes: first, what is there for people 
operating different sets of symbols, and second, how the valuations of these 
symbols change over time. Imposing a net of relations of symbolic representa-
tion onto reality works like a colour filter: it sharpens some hues and modifies, 
blurs, or obfuscates others. People cannot relate to things that are not represent-
ed, even though they can represent things that do not exist.  
Symbols are used by way of four analytically distinguishable but empirical-
ly inseparable symbolic functions (Elias 2011, 85ff): knowing, speaking, think-
ing and remembering. But using symbols in any way requires operations on 
images stored in memory (ibid., 91ff), and remembering is present in every 
occurrence of thinking, speaking, and knowing (ibid., 86ff).  
Remembering is the symbolic function whose link to the formation of na-
tional habitus is the closest, as Giselinde Kuipers puts it: 
Habitus is congealed history, absorbed into our bodies – our personal history, 
which, in turn, has been shaped by the history of the society of which we are 
part. This larger history determines the ground-tone of our individual history. 
Thus, our ‘self’, our self- evident, automatic, yet learned behaviour, is partly 
determined by the country where we have grown up. (Kuipers 2012, 20) 
Determination of our behaviour is a function of our personal – individual – 
history, which in turn is a function of the history of the society in which we 
live. We absorb history as we live. This means that a causal link between 
events of the past and elements of national habitus can be established, if only 
by way of an exemplification or an analogy, or by quoting similarities in indi-
vidual experiences as a proof of their inherent social character. But the theoret-
ical question remains: how exactly do people absorb history? The answer is: 
through symbols and as symbols. 
Any habitus is related to the past experiences of individuals as represented 
by symbols. An experience becomes collective because the symbols are social, 
not the other way around. Even though Elias strongly opposed the sociological 
fiction of an isolated human being, homo clausus, the locus of sociality in his 
symbol theory is not the experience itself, but the way of remembering it and 
sharing knowledge of it in image, speech, and writing. Interdependent individ-
uals use the channels of their social network to communicate employing the 
resources put at their disposal by their habitus, but the habitus are also made up 
of the very same resources. Communications, messages, and their recipients 
are, however, conditioned but not fully determined by the properties of the 
network: behind each communication, as behind each action, there is an agent 
and an agency limited by interdependencies which do not leave any human 
being uninvolved. That is why – as Jeffrey K. Olick once put it – “people do 
things with words [or, rather, with symbols] but not always […] in circum-
stances of their own choosing” (Olick 2016, 52). 
This account of remembering and its role in the national habitus would be 
incomplete without a mention of forgetting. Forgetting has long been a primary 
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concern of memory studies, especially those dealing with modern societies 
(Connerton 2009). But it is the link between forgetting and fantasizing which 
bears the most on the construction of national habitus. Fantasizing not only fills 
the gaps left by forgetting, but it also helps to provide a frame for remembering 
by imagining things which never were. The work on symbols is thus conducted 
by memory, which selects symbols to be used, condemning others to be (tem-
porarily or permanently) forgotten, and “gluing” the pieces together by fanta-
sies wherever necessary.  
Detecting forgetting and fantasy by juxtaposing what is remembered and 
what could be remembered by contrasting memories of different groups (in-
cluding different national groups) is common in memory studies. For example, 
it is fruitful to compare memories of war of nations which were fighting one 
another, including their reciprocal group images (cf. Szacka 2006; Jakoubek, 
Svoboda, and Budilovа 2009; Karstedt 2009). Sometimes national memories 
clash in political institutions or artworks, or even in a single family (Obradović 
2016). Competition of memories, a common phenomenon in a global world, 
may be a sign and an effect of shifting power balances and can help understand 
integration and disintegration above the level of the nation-state. Similarly, 
analyzing the particular design of a national habitus competing with others can 
shed light upon power balances within a nation-state-society, and the competi-
tion of alternative framings may explain the proportion of fantasy in the collec-
tive memory. 
The connection between symbol theory and the concept of national habitus 
runs through memory management of past events by way of remembering, 
forgetting, and fantasizing. This locates my research in the line similar to, 
though not identical with, that of, for example, Gad Yair’s work on the link 
between cultural trauma and national habitus among Israelis (Yair 2015). 
While Yair stresses the impact of cultural trauma on aspects of Israeli habitus, I 
focus on the use of symbolic functions as the social mechanism mediating 
between the events of the past (which may and often are but need not necessari-
ly be traumatic) and habitual behaviour in the present, including ways of feel-
ing about the world. Symbolic resources frame and maintain the national habi-
tus as an “affective household of nations” (Kuzmics and Axtmann 2007, 5f.). 
3.  A Borderline Prayer Close Up 
The Solo Dios Basta Foundation, a Catholic NGO (established in 2015), which 
acted as the organizer of “Rosary to the Borders,” chose 7 October 2017 for a 
number of reasons: October is a month of rosary prayer in the Catholic Church, 
and the 7th of this month is the day of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Our Lady of 
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the Rosary.
2
 The action was named “Różaniec do granic,” and the English 
translation “Rosary to the Borders” conveys the double meaning of the origi-
nal: the rosary was, literally, to be taken to the borders, and the rosary prayer 
was also metaphorically taken to its limits because of the unusual character of 
the event.  
The webpage of the action
3
 opens with the poster representing a physical map 
of Earth on which the shape of Poland is visible in a blow-up, made out by 
rosary beads radiating an unearthly whitish light illuminating the globe. A 
caption “Save Poland and the world with the rosary!” is placed in the upper 
part, and underneath we read: “In the end, my immaculate heart will triumph,” 
a reference to the revelation of the Blessed Virgin Mary which the Catholic 
Church recognizes as having taken place in Fatima, Portugal in 1917.  
Even though “Rosary to the Borders” was not organized by the Catholic 
Church itself, it was endorsed and supported by it. The Conference of the Epis-
copate of Poland, the highest decision-making body of Catholic Church in 
Poland, issued a statement in which the scope of involvement was left for the 
local bishops to decide. On the web page of the action, materials and instruc-
tions were made available to those priests taking part in the action, listed to-
gether with other downloadable content coming from the organizers (posters, 
maps etc.). 
The detailed content of Church materials prepared by the relevant Commis-
sion of the Episcopate (54 pages altogether, Różaniec… 2017), strikes an ob-
server familiar with Catholic rites and celebrations as somewhat subdued under 
the circumstances. Their wording is relatively balanced (compared to the mate-
rial provided by the organizers), and so is their message. This may in itself be 
informative of the Church’s official, slightly reserved, standpoint. However, 
the action was an unreserved success in terms of the turnout and organization, 
even though it was not very spectacular if observed at close quarters.
4
  
Compared to the Church documents, the materials of the organizers seem 
much richer in historical references and rhetorical effects. They differ in form, 
from a two-pages-long press release (Solo Dios… 2017), through a set of me-
dia comments and interviews, up to an album Podnieście głowy [Raise your 
heads] (Podnieście… 2017), published in the aftermath of the action. 
                                                             
2
  The Rosary prayer consists of a repeated series of ten Hail Marys (Ave Maria) preceded by 
the Lord’s Prayer (Pater Noster) and followed by the Gloria prayer (Gloria Patri). The decades 
of Ave Marias are counted on beads on a string arranged in tenths. Each tenth of Ave Mari-
as is dedicated to a particular event from the Gospels (a “Mystery”), of which there are cur-
rently 20 (four sets of five).  
3
  <http://www.rozaniecdogranic.pl/start> (Polish only; accessed 30.09.2018). 
4
  A task accomplished by my collaborator Joanna Mazur in Zgorzelec on the Polish-German 
border. I am indebted to Joanna for her engaged and competent help as data-gatherer and 
for her assistance in relating the results of her unobtrusive observation. 
HSR 45 (2020) 1  │  160 
The album is an important document for it covers not only the “Rosary to 
the Borders,” but also another event organized by the same NGO a year before: 
“Wielka Pokuta” (The Great Atonement). It was a mass prayer in Jasna Góra 
(the most important religious centre in Poland) held on 15 October 2015, pre-
ceded by “the Jericho of Atonement” (Jerycho Przebłagalne),5 a continuous 
prayer, with the intention of “repenting for the sins of Poles.” On the webpage 
of the Great Atonement
6
 (much less impressive than the Rosary to the Borders, 
with no visuals on the homepage but with a large load of downloadable con-
tent), a blurb of Podnieście głowy informs the reader that this joint summary of 
The Great Atonement and Rosary to the Borders is aimed at discovering 
“God’s plan for the Poles.” It further reads: “We usually regard history through 
the lens of great historical events: treaties, wars, uprisings. But are we also 
capable of seeing God’s action in the history of our Homeland?
7
 God is the 
Lord of history, after all!” Further, prayer is announced to be “the best way to 
fight for peace and for a strong Homeland,” and both the Great Atonement and 
Rosary to the Borders are said to be an effort to “read the signs of the time.”
 
That is why the album is declared an “obligatory reading on the 100th anniver-
sary of Poland’s independence.”
8
 Consequently, I decided to include the Jeri-
cho of Atonement in this analysis as a variation on the theme of the “nation 
penitent” (see Porter 2001). 
The instructions for the Jericho of Atonement praise the atonement as means 
to “reverse the course of history of the nation and the whole world” (Jericho… 
2016, 1). History is outlined by way of cataloguing sins covered by the national 
repentance. However, anyone interested in the Catholic perception of sins 
particular for the Polish national group would be disappointed. In the long list 
of sins beginning on page 3 of the document only two are nation-specific,
9
 and 
a further four have a direct political meaning: atonement for “treason and col-
laboration,” “social injustice,” “hatred and prejudice against other nationali-
ties,” and “permitting ideologies promoting violence, terror and sexual devia-
tion.” The combination of violence and terrorism with sexual deviation seems 
particularly puzzling, as they are usually associated with mutually hostile ideo-
logies. However, most of the sins for which the prayer was held were probably 
committed by non-Catholics (such as “libeling the Catholic Church”). A large 
majority of the sins in question concerned family and sexual life and religious 
practices which are universal in Catholic teaching.  
                                                             
5
   <http://wielkapokuta.pl/sites/default/files/Jerycho_przeblagalne_za_grzechy_polakow.pdf> 
[accessed 30.09.2018]. 
6
  <http://wielkapokuta.pl/> (accessed 30.09.2018). 
7
  Capitalized in original. 
8
  <http://wielkapokuta.pl/> (accessed 30.09.2018). 
9
  “Breaking faith to the vows of Jasna Góra,” and “failing to do everything […] to make Po-
land a real Kingdom of God’s Mother and Jesus Christ […] in personal, family, national and 
social life.” 
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On the other hand, the act of forgiveness also included in the rite is histori-
cally and politically very nation-specific: “we forgive all wrongdoings against 
us by other nations: we forgive the destruction of our national identity by those 
who partitioned our land, the crimes of the communist system, the crimes of 
Hitlerism, Stalinism, the Katyń and the Volhynia crimes” (Jericho… 2016, 4). 
The order of crimes is significant, even though the catalogue itself is quite 
standard, and the inclusion of the Volhynia slaughter (of Polish civilians by the 
Ukrainians at the end of World War II) is an addition which nobody would 
probably have thought of 30 years ago. Incidentally, there are evident similari-
ties between the wording of the prayer and the law of 26 January 2018 later 
dubbed by the international press the “Polish Holocaust Law” (see Bucholc and 
Komornik 2019) – one of the main innovations of which consisted in granting 
legal equality between the Volhynia crimes and the crimes committed by the 
Nazis and the Soviets. In Jericho, the partitions come first, communism comes 
next, and Nazism and Stalinism are put together with Katyń (a Soviet mass 
murder of Polish officers during World War II) and Volhynia. The overall 
message is that other nations have sinned against the Polish nation on a number 
of very specific occasions, whereas the sins of Poles are mostly general, usually 
committed by non-Catholics, and they are never sins committed specifically 
against named other nations (“hatred and prejudice” against other nations is 
generalized). The Great Atonement presents the picture of the Polish nation as 
a victim of history, an image culminating in the Litany of the Polish Nation, the 
main part of the Atonement rite, where a long list of national calamities from 
times immemorial is included (Jericho… 2016, 5ff). The Great Atonement was 
described as a Polish penitential prayer, but a detailed analysis proves that it 
was much more a prayer of remembrance of the sins against the Poles.  
The Great Atonement was a very innovative prayer action, though probably 
less so then the Rosary to the Borders – for which it paved the way – and it 
provided initial networking and organizational know-how. The timing of the 
two actions meant that the political context of the second action had changed. 
In the press announcement of Solo Dios Basta published on 20 July 2017, it is 
implied that Poland finds itself at a critical moment in history, in particular, 
that unspecified “recent events” clearly showed the need of divine support for 
Poland. The events in question would include not only the continuing discus-
sions around the distribution of Muslim migrants throughout the EU, but also 
the acute social conflict inflicted upon the country by the so-called “reform of 
the judiciary” in summer 2017, when the political takeover of the judiciary led 
to protests and demonstrations across the country (Bucholc and Komornik 
2018). Where the biblical story of Jericho was about bringing walls down, 
Rosary to the Borders was about reconstructing the walls protecting Poland 
from the outside world. 
In the press release informing of the action, which was the main document 
produced by the organizers, we read: 
HSR 45 (2020) 1  │  162 
We are praying “to the limit of our possibilities”. We invite the Poles to get 
off the couch, to leave their cozy life in front of the TV or a computer, to take 
up the arms of prayer and to fight for the salvation of the world. We invite 
them to go to the borders of Poland, to the borders of their own weakness, the 
borders of the safe world, maybe even the border of fear. (Solo Dios 2017) 
The suggestion of fear in the context of the Schengen borders, which millions 
of Poles cross yearly in a casual manner, must be read as a call to endow them 
with a new meaning. Beyond the borders, the safe world ends and, perhaps, 
something to be feared begins. Of course, habitus formation is a process which 
happens over decades and centuries, and it would be naïve to expect a mere ten 
years after the beginning of the “affective household” of the Polish people that 
we would see reflected a new state of international inclusiveness and unre-
strained mobility. Rather, what we see is an illuminating example of the drag 
effect of habitus (see Ernst, Weischer, and Alikhani 2017) and an incompatibil-
ity between the new political reality and the state of affectively-loaded symbol-
ic resources. Equally, it is an illustration of the manipulative potential of dis-
crepancies created by the dragging effects in habitus formation. 
The organizers of the action also stressed the international impact of Rosary 
to the Borders in a different context.
10
 The action had a sizeable ripple effect. 
Catholics in many countries, including Australia,
11
 Italy, Ireland,
12
 the UK,
13
 
and the US
14
 organized similar events, acknowledging the Polish inspiration. A 
detailed comparative analysis would warrant a separate article, but a provision-
al overview suggests that ritual demarcation of a state territory did not feature 
equally strongly in all cases. For example, instead of the delimitating effect of 
the radiant rosary represented in the poster of the Polish action and, to an ex-
tent, in the Australian one, the aspect of the string of rosary beads as a form of 
connectivity dominates the visuals of the British action. The idea behind the 
American action was actually to connect the two US coasts and not to over-
write the national borders (but the US is not part to any equivalent of the 
Schengen Agreement). The juxtaposition of one country and the rest of the 
world is also less pronounced in most other national rosary actions.
15
  
Apart from the international impact, the fact that prayer was also organized 
by Polish Catholics abroad was represented as one more proof of success (Pod-
                                                             
10
  See: <https://wpolityce.pl/kosciol/403219-rozaniec-do-granic-coraz-bardziej-popularny-na-
swiecie> (Accessed 02.10.2018). 
11
  <https://www.churchmilitant.com/news/article/australian-catholics-have-their-own-
national-rosary> (Accessed 02.10.2018). 
12
  <https://www.coastalrosaryireland.ie/> (Accessed 30.09.2018). 
13
  <https://www.rosaryonthecoast.co.uk> (Accessed 30.09.2018). 
14
  <http://rosarycoasttocoast.com/> (accessed 30.09.2018). 
15
  This juxtaposition caused a certain upheaval in the international press: For example, an Italian 
newspaper even tagged the prayer as “la marcia dei cattolici polacchi contro i migranti,” see: 
<https://www.giornalettismo.com/archives/2634920/rosario-alle-frontiere-polonia> (accessed 
30.09.2018). 
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nieście… 2017). Anthropologically speaking, the fact that a borderline prayer 
was also organized in places where there was no border at all constitutes an 
extrapolation and transposition of the notion of a border. A border is a geo-
graphical and political concept, but it is also an anthropological one, and the 
border on which the rosary is prayed transforms each homogenous space into a 
divided one: the prayer becomes a weapon against spatial and social non-
differentiation.  
4.  Framing the Habitus: Mnemonic Transposition of 
Symbolic Resources in Rosary to the Borders 
Rosary to the Borders was an extraordinarily, symbolically-loaded action. I 
propose to divide symbolic resources referring to history which were employed 
in the action into three categories: (1) common Catholic resources, (2) country-
specific Catholic resources, and (3) national memory resources. I focus on the 
past-oriented symbols, and I stop at the national level; I do not account for 
resources available on lower levels of the figuration (like local saints, local 
ritual idiosyncrasies, etc.), which also mattered in how the prayer played out in 
various locations. 
4.1  Common Catholic Resources 
Symbols in this category are available and meaningful for all Catholics, even 
though they may carry a different emotional load for various groups. They 
would also, typically, be of limited use for those who do not belong to the 
Catholic Church. Common resources include universal Church rites, practices, 
celebrations, and the history of the Church and of the Catholic religion.  
The most important of the many common Catholic resources employed in 
the Rosary to the Borders is the rosary prayer as a common religious rite, evi-
denced by the Fatima Revelations of 1917 (exactly a hundred years earlier). As 
mentioned in the Introduction, October is a month of rosary, and 7 October is 
the day of Our Lady of the Rosary. The circumstances in which this particular 
date was chosen by Pope Pius V, who introduced this day into the Church 
calendar, is probably unknown to most Catholics. The date is the date of battle 
of Lepanto in 1571 when united Catholic forces defeated a Muslim Ottoman 
fleet in a great sea battle in which, according to Church tradition, Mary inter-
vened on the side of the Catholics (the day was the feast day of Our Lady of 
Victory) and Pope Pius V had a corresponding vision while praying the rosary. 
The story is told in detail in Church documents and is referred to on the ac-
tion’s website as one of the express reasons to observe this precise date. Further 
common resources contribute to the framing of the prayer: omnipresent mo-
tives of defence of faith, human life, and family.  
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Common symbolic resources bestow a glamour of universality and dis-
charge the suspicion of parochiality. Moreover, they make it easier for others to 
follow: Italian or US Catholics may find it implausible to pray for Poland, but 
it is possible for them to imitate the Poles in praying for something which is 
common for all. Figurational analysis of the use of common resources would 
point in the direction of a higher integration level emerging within the global 
religious organization. It does not possess the typical means of securing the 
level of civilization corresponding to the scope and strength of integration 
available to states, but its substantial power over its members is supported by a 
stock of common symbols maintained by common practices.  
For example, the remembrance of Mary as one of the central figures of the 
global Catholic pantheon is maintained by the rosary prayer as a practice which 
protects the symbols related to Mary from elimination or replacement by other 
symbols. To realize that this could happen, it suffices merely to reflect on the 
many saints who were once central to universal Church rites and practices and 
who are now virtually forgotten to the extent that some of their names no long-
er “ring any bells” for most Catholics. 
The metaphor of bell-ringing may be restated in terms of involvement and 
detachment (Elias 2007b). While the Catholic community as a whole has de-
tached itself from much of its former cult of saints and, especially, from sym-
bols from the earliest periods of Christianity, these symbols are still preserved 
in the collective memory: in litanies, local prayers, iconography, and reliquar-
ies. But they will have lost their emotional charge, and the involvement in these 
symbols in the Catholic community as a whole is minimal. Mary, on the other 
hand, still carries an inordinate emotional load as probably the single strongest 
symbol in the Catholic Church (Llywelyn 2016). One of the reasons why this 
female symbol in the otherwise so male-dominated religious community has 
achieved such a high standing is its capacity to be adapted to local surround-
ings and inscribed in symbolic frames of less than universal reach (Warner 
1976). 
4.2  Country-Specific Catholic Resources 
There are also symbols and practices involved in Rosary to the Borders which 
are specific to Poland, not in the strong sense of being absent from all other 
national Catholic communities, but in the limited sense of referring to the lim-
ited group experience of Polish Catholics. These resources are still predomi-
nantly Catholic (they would not be shared by those Poles who are not Catho-
lics, and if they would be understandable to them, it would only be “second-
hand” cultural knowledge). But they would be equally unintelligible for Catho-
lics of other nations.  
One important resource is the little-known revelation in 1877 at Gietrzwałd 
in Ermland, now a part of Poland (Polish: Warmia). Two Catholic Polish girls 
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claimed that Lady Mary induced them to pray the rosary. The effect of this 
revelation for Polish nation-building during the Kulturkampf (Culture War) was 
stressed by Polish sociologist Stanisław Ossowski, who was studying Polish 
national identity in Warmia in the 1940s. Even though the revelation of 
Gietrzwałd was recognized by the Church in 1977 and could count as a com-
mon Catholic symbol, I classify it as nation-specific due to its close link with 
the national identity and its predominantly local significance.  
A number of prayer practices are referred to in the Church documentation of 
Rosary to the Borders, which paved the way for its taking place in the public 
and lay space of everyday life. Apart from the customs common throughout the 
Church or for many local Churches, such as Corpus Christi or the public Via 
Crucis, there are those perceived as locally Polish, like the rural prayer meet-
ings at crossroads shrines and crosses (Różaniec 2017, 17). Although the latter 
would take place in May and the prayer would normally be according to Litany 
of Loreto, the fact that apart from annual public mass celebrations there is also 
a custom of praying publicly on a very small scale bears upon the possibility of 
bricolage of the religious symbols into a different configuration of a similar 
nature.  
Another important country-specific Catholic resource is related to the histo-
ry of Poland as a country surrounded by non-Catholic populations: heathen, 
Muslim, Orthodox, and Protestant. In the battles fought against these enemies, 
the religious motif was invariably of central political importance. The religious 
coverage of politics included many miracles featuring Mary as defender of 
Polish Catholic armed forces and civilians against the religious others. Mary 
was celebrated as a figure of existential relevance for the nation by the Polish 
king John II Casimir (from the Swedish Vasa dynasty), who declared her the 
Queen of the Polish Crown in 1656 in Lwów (now Lviv in Ukraine). The act 
took place in the aftermath of the defence of Jasna Góra, which was believed to 
have been saved from the Protestant Swedes by a direct intervention of the 
Mother of God. The narrative of these events was given prominence in the 19th 
century by Poland’s greatest historical novelist, the Nobel-Prize-winning Hen-
ryk Sienkiewicz, in his monumental epic The Deluge (Sienkiewicz 1904). 
Mary as a female symbol turns out to possess a considerable military poten-
tial, reinforced by the recurrence over centuries of her intercessions in times of 
war and oppression (see Porter 2005, 2011). One of the most well-known coun-
try-specific Catholic symbols is the so-called “Apel Jasnogórski,” the Call of 
Jasna Góra, the wording of which combines the queenship of Lady Mary with 
the idea of knightly or military vigil and with the religious ideal of an incessant 
adoration: “Mary, Queen of Poland, I am here, I remember, I keep vigil.”
16
 This 
prayer, although it predates World War II, became a widespread national reli-
                                                             
16
  Maryjo, Królowo Polski, jestem przy Tobie, pamiętam, czuwam.  
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gious symbol during the war and retained its significance later under Com-
munist rule. I would argue that this prayer is the single most powerful symbol 
in which Polishness and Catholicism became combined in recent Polish histo-
ry. Nevertheless, the potency of Apel Jasnogórski lies precisely in the combina-
tion of many emotionally-loaded items. Its essence is being there, constantly, 
for someone, who is not only the mother of all people (as Catholicism repre-
sents Mary), but also a queen and the mother of a particular national group.  
Reference to remembering in the prayer is also illustrative of the fusion of 
national and sacred history: apart from remembering the Mariological aspects 
of the symbol (part of the common Catholic tradition), the praying person is 
also implicitly called upon to remember those which are country-specific and 
thereby to remember the national history. Universality and groupness are reu-
nited and reconcile what is otherwise irreconcilable. 
4.3  National Memory Resources 
The irreconcilability is evident if we move further in the direction of national 
memory. Here, too, a reservation should be made: even though these symbols 
pertain to Poland, they are not always uniquely Polish. They use religious im-
agery in order to convey a set of ideas and emotions focusing on the nation, and 
many national groups may have the same ideas about themselves.  
Probably the oldest of those is the idea of Antemurale Christianitatis (Bul-
wark of Christianity): Poland as being in the frontline of the fight against non-
Christian forces, from which all Christian nations benefit (Morawiec 2001). 
This condition was shared by Poland and many other countries on the Eastern 
outskirts of Christian Europe (Srodecki 2015), and in all of them gave rise to an 
idea that they had a particular mission of defending Christianity against non-
Christianity. The old notion of military mission related to the Christian identity 
of the nation was refined in the age of Romanticism. The country was, as it is 
usually put in a well-worn Polish phrase, “wiped off the map” at the end of 
18th century until 1918; the period is referred to as the Partitions and I will 
discuss its huge importance for both state and habitus formation in more detail 
below. Despite the lack of political independence (or, maybe, because of it), 
Polish culture in the 19th century forged crucial concepts relating to national 
identity by means of some of the best literary productions in its history. Motifs 
of God and homeland were tightly intertwined, in particular in the work of the 
most acclaimed poet of the Polish language, Adam Mickiewicz. He created a 
fully-fledged romantic version of Polish messianism, a concept according to 
which Poland was a “Christ among the Nations,” a Messiah suffering for other 
nations of the West. The suffering in question, under the repressive Russian 
administration, was very real, and Mickiewicz translated its political dimension 
(just as he translated his ideals of universal human solidarity and freedom) into 
religious terms, thus establishing a fully-fledged political ideology of messian-
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ism (Walicki 1978; Krasnodębski 2002) as a part of his political theology. 
These concepts were preached from the pulpit in a venue as prominent as the 
College de France in Paris, where Mickiewicz lectured in 1840.  
The idea and iconography of Poland as a Christ among the Nations became 
well embedded in the national imagery, much better than a less religiously 
loaded, but otherwise very similar symbol of Poland as the “Winkelried of 
Nations,” forged by another national bard, Juliusz Słowacki, at roughly the 
same time (Morawiec 2001). The reference is to a Swiss national hero, Arnold 
Winkelried. Słowacki’s concept, however, shows that the image of Poland as a 
land offering a redemptory and life-saving self-sacrifice for other nations was 
in fact a composed symbol with a definite prevalence of the national reference: 
a projected self-definition of the nation could be assembled of religious ele-
ments, but it could equally well be bricolaged using lay imagery. The latter 
was, however, far less successful in terms of the marketing of ideas and trans-
lated far worse into a comprehensive design of a national habitus. 
In Rosary to the Borders and in the Jericho of Atonement, we find the im-
plicit messianic idea of Poland praying for others and suffering for others. The 
references to national memory resources are less pronounced, possibly to dis-
arm any anti-chauvinist campaigning. The action was attacked anyway: an MP 
for the opposition debunked it as a prayer “against something,” and “a wave of 
hate” against the action rose throughout the social media.
17
 However, it would 
hardly be fair to Rosary to the Borders to call it a “prayer against something”: it 
was a prayer for a certain national habitus to prevail in order for the country to 
be redeemed. The means of redemption in this case is prayer, not suffering, but 
the implication of it is that Poland, as opposed to many other countries, has 
retained the ability to pray effectively due to its suffering. This unique quality, 
imitated by others on a far smaller scale, can in turn be related to historically 
embedded national symbols with great emotional load, such as “Christ among 
the Nations.” 
5.  State Formation and the Two Uses of National Habitus 
As demonstrated above, the assimilation of Catholicism and Polishness has a 
solid symbolic base. However, a national habitus is not a pure self-projection, a 
we-image created by a national group from within as a response to figurational 
challenges such as the external political and military threat: it is relational. A 
habitus is a response to projections of other groups, which leads in the direction 
of the model of established and outsiders, one of the most operationable 
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  See: <https://www.tvp.info/34300576/co-za-idiota-to-wymyslil-wielka-akcja-hejtowania-
modlitwy-rozancowej> [Accessed 02.10.2018]. 
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achievements of Eliasian sociology (Elias and Scotson 1994). The national 
habitus combining the use of Catholic and national symbols was, for a large 
part of Polish history, a hostile reaction to projections made from without by 
those for whom the Catholic Polishness also provided an excellent symbol to 
be used in their own we-image constructions, albeit a negative one. There was 
a certain symmetry in using Catholic symbolic resources in the we-images of 
Poles and they-images designed by other national groups.  
National habitus works in two directions and has two distinct uses. The first 
is the external one: a habitus is directed against those outside the national 
group, as an instrument of distinction. Second, the habitus is used in the inter-
nal competition within a larger figuration which may develop within a group 
(the latter use of habitus was probably more explicit in the works of a zealous 
student of this problematic, Pierre Bourdieu, see Witte 2017). The internal and 
the external use of habitus may overlap for some of the time. They very rarely 
overlap all of the time for any national group, but sometimes they do so for a 
substantial period of time, and this was the case of Catholic symbols and their 
affective correlates in Polish national habitus.  
The historical dynamic of the relationship between Catholic and national el-
ements would depend, of course, on the vicissitudes of state formation process-
es in the Early Modern period and in 19th century, which have indirectly 
brought about the current Polish state society producing actions such as Rosary 
to the Borders. A detailed account of these processes would be far beyond the 
scope of this article, but in any piece of writing based on Eliasian premises the 
particularities of Polish state-formation needs to be stated.
18
 It is advisable to 
focus on the period up to and including the 19th century, not only because it is 
consistent with the timeframe of Elias’s own work in comparative historical 
sociology, but also because it is the period when the peculiarities of Polish state 
formation (or, rather, non-state formation) are best observed and their influence 
on contemporary phenomena can be identified (for a brief overview of Polish 
history focusing on the link between religion and nation-building, see Porter 
2018).  
The peculiarities in question include, first and foremost, the incomparable 
political strength of an exceptionally numerous as well as highly internally 
stratified nobility, ruthlessly exploiting the peasant class and dominating the 
few weak cities. The result was an effective monopolization of state-formation 
processes by landed nobility and the subsequent drag-effect of the class habitus 
of nobility in 19th and 20th century (analyzed, albeit from a very different 
theoretical stance, in Leder 2014). From the 15th century onwards the state was 
an elective monarchy with a gradually weakening central power, especially 
after the Jagiellonian dynasty ended in 1572. At the (short-lived) climax of its 
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  Readings in English on Polish history, apart from other works cited here, could include: 
Davies 1981a, 1981b; Kłoczowski 2000; and Kenney 2002, 2007. 
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territorial expansion, the country comprised the Polish Kingdom and the Great 
Duchy of Lithuania and stretched from Dorpat to far beyond Kijów (today 
Kiev, Ukraine) and from Poznań to Smoleńsk (today: Smolensk, Russia). This 
immense area was largely decentralized, lacked an effective monopoly of vio-
lence and tax collection, had next to no standing army, and only an elementary 
civil administration. The net result was a decrease in the international standing 
of Poland coinciding with an aggressive territorial expansion of all its powerful 
neighbours (including Russia, Prussia, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire). 
Modern state monopoly was never successfully established in any domain. As 
the country failed to modernize, it gradually became politically and economi-
cally subservient to the interests of foreign powers and, at the end of 18th cen-
tury, was divided up by Austria, Prussia, and Russia. From this point of view, 
state formation in Poland lacks all the crucial characteristics of the processes 
taking place in Western Europe analyzed by Elias (2006, 2012).  
From the figurational perspective, during the partitions, the former Polish 
territory and population was incorporated into three foreign imperial state-
formation processes. Only one of the partitioning powers, Austria (later Austro-
Hungary), was Catholic, and the other two persecuted Catholicism with varying 
intensity. Therefore, during the partitions, the Catholic component of Polish 
national habitus – whose salience has been rising constantly ever since the 
initial short-termed success of the Reformation among Polish nobility in 16th 
century – gained even more weight. As a result of the partitions the Poles, as an 
established Catholic group, became outsiders, and Catholicism gained new 
importance in their we-image formation, resulting in an enhancement of the 
now clichéd equation Pole-Catholic (Polak-Katolik) (see Porter 2001). While 
both internal and external uses of Catholic symbols predated the loss of state-
formation control to foreigners, its internal use in 19th century greatly boosted 
the potential of Catholic symbols, as the overview given above of nation-
specific Catholic as well as national memory resources partly illustrates. Elias 
insisted that the Poles and Germans have a lot in common (Elias 1994), but 
what they had in common most of all was a long-standing antagonism. In the 
19th century, its strong religious component became pivotal, as a result of 
Protestant Prussian participation in the partitions of Poland; from then on, any 
reconciliation between the two nations could very well be seen as a “miracle” 
(Wiatr 2014). 
In the novels of Gustav Freytag, which were recommended reading for gen-
erations of German youth (Adorno 1942/1997) with their ardent anti-Polishness 
motivated by adoration of the Iron Chancellor, Poles are portrayed as “lazy, 
uncontrollable, and even wild in comparison to the hard working, superior 
Germans” (Nance 2008, 46). Freytag offers a literary version of sentiments 
which, in the academic world, were expressed by no less a scholar than Max 
Weber. While Weber’s anti-Polish sentiments have been explored in recent 
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scholarship (Konno 2004; Zimmerman 2006; Boatca 2013), it is worth re-
calling the passage in which Weber characterized Poles:  
And why is it the Polish peasants who are gaining the land? Is it their superior 
economic intelligence, or their greater supply of capital? It is rather the oppo-
site of both these factors. Under a climate, and on a soil, which favour the 
growing of cereals and potatoes above all, alongside extensive cattle-raising, 
the person who is least threatened by an unfavourable market is the one who 
brings his products to the place where they are least devalued by a collapse in 
prices: his own stomach. This is the person who produces for his own re-
quirements. And once again, the person who can set his own requirements at 
the lowest level, the person who makes the smallest physical and mental de-
mands for the maintenance of his life, is the one with the advantage. The small 
Polish peasant in East Germany is a type far removed from the bustling peas-
ant owner of a dwarf property, whom one may see here in the well-favoured 
valley of the Rhine as he forges links with the towns via greenhouse cultiva-
tion and market-gardening. The small Polish peasant gains more land, because 
he as it were eats the very grass from off of it […], he gains not despite but on 
account of the low level of his physical and intellectual habits of life. (Weber 
1980, 434) 
In these words, uttered ex cathedra as a part of Weber’s inaugural lecture at the 
University of Freiburg in 1895, economic factors neatly interweave with cul-
tural ones. Catholicism is not mentioned expressly, probably because of the 
assumed religious sympathies of the audience, but low physical and intellectual 
habits of the Polish peasant are offered as an explanation of the much-feared 
Polish agricultural offensive in Eastern Germany. Poles were, according to 
Weber, one of the cultural categories devoid of symbolic resources essential for 
Western-style modernization, which landed them in the row of cultural “oth-
ers” from whom Weber, as Jack Goody put it (2006), “stole history.” 
Even though Weber’s anti-Polish philippics did not provoke Polish intellec-
tuals to any reaction worth mentioning, he did receive a letter from (according 
to the signature) a student from Lemberg (formerly Lwów, now Lviv, Ukraine), 
which I quote here from Hajime Konno: 
Max (imus) scilicet Gemeinster 
W(ilder) Eber! 
Dieser Name gebührt Dir! Schmach und Schande über die Mutter, die einem 
der gemeinsten Raubtiere das Leben geschenkt hat. […] Du aber erkennst als 
Dein höchstes Ideal an die Vertilgung Deiner Mitmenschen, die Dir nichts 
schlechtes gemacht haben, der Polen, welche Deine Vorfahren Jahrhunderte 
schützten vor der Invasion der Tartaren und Türken. Schade daß Deinen Keim 
nicht aufgefressen hat ein tartarisches Schwein vor Jahrhunderten […]! 
Zduński 
aus Lemberg cand. iur. an Weber auf seine Antrittsrede hin am 13. Juli 1895 
(Konno 2004, 71) 
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In this short passage, an expression of national resentment is framed by the idea 
of Antemurale Christianitatis: Weber belongs to the group of beneficiaries of 
Polish courage in defending Western Europe against (Muslim) Turks and Tar-
tars. In this narrative, Poles were, literally, the necessary condition of existence 
of the West. For that sacrifice, instead of gratitude, the Poles meet with hostili-
ty and oppression: they suffer for others as befits the “Christ among the Na-
tions.”  
As soon as Poland returned onto the path of nation-state-formation in 1918, 
the issue of the external and internal use of Catholic symbols had to be restated, 
for a great need arose for mobilizable symbolic resources in the internal state-
society dynamic. Apart from the external threat, the internal minority question 
gave rise to intense work on symbols, and this time the mobilization of Cathol-
icism against the Jewish minority (and, to a lesser extent, other religious, eth-
nic, and linguistic minorities) was of primary importance (see Porter 2014). To 
make it possible to use the image of a Pole-Catholic against the others (Ger-
mans, Soviets, etc.) and at the same time against a (Jewish) sub-group of mem-
bers of the nascent Polish state society, the Pole-Catholic must be made suffi-
ciently distinct from the non-Catholic (alleged) Poles, but so as not to move 
him too close to any of the external groups: the fight against the internal out-
siders must not lead to a weakening of external resistance. I will not offer my 
figurational view on the history of the interwar period. It lasted only 21 years, 
less than one generation. Despite the debates regarding its real significance in 
the history of Poland, this interwar period would have to be deemed by a fig-
urational sociologist interested in habitus formation as too short to matter due 
to the drag effects of habitus from previous epochs but for the fact that it was 
the beginning of modern nation-state-formation in Poland. It was potentially 
the beginning of a new line of tradition: a developmental line of a republican, 
democratic, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, centralized nation-state.  
Ironically, with the physical extermination or expulsion of most of the mi-
norities and the disappearance of the interwar social complexities in the post-
war homogenous socialist Polish-nation state, the salience of Catholicism as a 
weapon against minorities was as good as annihilated and a new context of 
power balances for both external and internal use appeared (see Kubik 1994). 
Dependence on the Soviet Union and Communist rule at home made Catholi-
cism a crucial resource for anti-establishment we-images. Catholic symbols 
were exploited in power struggles, creating a class-religion conundrum which 
appeared puzzling from the Western perspective. It was epitomized by the 
Solidarność movement in 1980s: Catholic workers led by Lech Wałęsa with the 
Black Madonna from Jasna Góra pinned to his chest, supported by priests, and 
prayed for in churches all over the land. The movement opposed the socialist 
state governed by a Communist party, while at the same time taking advice 
from members of intelligentsia, many of whom were of Marxist provenance 
and/or described themselves as “liberals” (Bernhard 1993). My thesis posits 
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Solidarność as the last word on a rare variant of national habitus which com-
bined Polishness and Catholicism as an inclusive formation open to people who 
would in other times hardly pass as Poles. Dynamics of inclusion and exclusion 
accompany internal and external uses of national habitus: from the period of 
Solidarność onwards, exclusion prevailed and internal use became more pro-
nounced.  
The external and the internal use of a habitus rarely overlap all the time for 
any national group. The reason for this is that in all usual scenarios, the level of 
the figuration on which the relationships with other national groups operate is 
higher than those on which internal struggles for a we-image of a group play 
out, and there is no simple transfer of symbolic resources from one figuration 
level to another. However, if the resources can be transmitted so as to allow a 
unification of the two uses, it can function as a great political asset for a habi-
tus. Such a combination would work both inside and outside the group. One 
framing which would be inclusive enough, while at the same time still preserv-
ing a clear division between external and internal, foreign and domestic, is 
offered by postcolonialism. 
6.  Postcolonial Syndrome: Threat and Double-Bind 
The reception of postcolonial studies
19
 in Central and Eastern Europe has ac-
celerated during the last two decades. Stanley Bill argued that post-colonialism 
was a “stillborn theory” in Poland as late as in 2014 (2014, 2), but his statement 
could be revised in the light of developments since 2015.
20
 Bill commented on 
the fact that “in many cases, the thinkers and writers applying the concepts of 
postcolonial theory have openly associated themselves with the Polish con-
servative right” as something “surprising when we consider that postcolonial 
theory in its canonical forms owes a great deal to Marxist, postmodernist and 
feminist theories – none of which are especially dear to Polish conservatives” 
(Bill 2014, 2). Nevertheless, there are at least two aspects to the postcolonial 
way of thinking about national identity which make it particularly useful in 
designing a national-conservative habitus, notwithstanding the assumed lack of 
ideological congeniality.  
The first one is its insistence on the value of cultural authenticity, which 
leads to “strategic essentialism” (Spivak 1985). Tracing authenticity, reconstru-
ing it, and, as it were, construing it from scratch implies a focus on the past, an 
                                                             
19
  In this article, I do not discuss the differences between dependency studies, postcolonial 
studies and postcolonial theory, which is not to say that there are none. See Schwarz & Ray 
(eds.): A Companion to Postcolonial Studies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
20
  A review of possibilities and criticisms can be found in an excellent volume edited by Jan 
Kieniewicz (2016, in Polish). 
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intensive work on symbols, a critical revaluation of symbolic resources, and 
channeling or re-channeling memories. In the competition of national habitus, 
the quest for authenticity is also the quest for demarcation criteria, setting the 
national group apart. Strategic essentialism posits the essential, unreducible and 
(frequently though not always) primordial properties of a group as demonstrat-
ing its uniqueness.  
The quest for authenticity in its postcolonial variant implies a serious effort, 
both on the part of individuals and societies, consisting in locating the impact 
of colonialism on the society, such as imposed legal, political, social, and cul-
tural orders. It then seeks either to eliminate such unsolicited imports or, at 
least, problematize their embeddedness in the colonial dependency. This opera-
tion can be performed both on the part of the colonizer and the colonized: both 
have their respective authenticities at stake in this procedure. The double bind 
implied in the effort of de-colonizing one’s own thinking is clear: for a political 
community, the quest for authenticity requires a reflection on its own norma-
tive and institutional order as an ill-fitted imposition, but the tools for this 
reflection must engage with this imposition on its own terms, however contest-
ed.  
At the level of individuals, efforts to become more authentic as members of 
a national community will not always be successful, precisely because the 
colonial impositions at the state-society level are mediated through individual 
involvement and require individual members of both the colonizing and the 
colonized society to cooperate in the importation and imposition, albeit usually 
indirectly. The fact that colonization relies on individual involvement is not 
only the rationale for the ethical commitment to reflect on the nature of such 
involvement, but also a useful political tool for introducing an internal use of 
post-colonial framing of national habitus. If the effort is to be made, there may 
be some who are not making the effort hard enough, some who are not even 
trying, and yet others constitutionally incapable of it because their involvement 
in the colonial dependency went too deep. Such individuals can be excluded 
from national community as they are incapable of ever acquiring an authentic 
national habitus. In Polish public debates after 2015, the internal use of national 
habitus follows this line.  
The internal and external uses of national habitus described above together 
form a “post-colonial syndrome.” Reverting to a national habitus in order to 
distinguish one’s own group from others and to exclude some individuals or 
categories within the group is a common property of national habitus. The 
postcolonial framing additionally stresses the authenticity-adverse impact of 
dependency and posits authenticity as the core value for the nation-state-
society. 
The notion of postcolonial syndrome, apart from its use in postcolonial 
trauma research (Craps 2013), appears in the writings of various authors in 
postcolonial studies, and it is usually applied to the experience of colonization 
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in Asia and Africa (see Bouvier 2006). In the Polish case, “postcolonial syn-
drome” was probably first conceptualized by Jan Sowa (Sowa 2011, 31) as 
“peripheral postcolonial syndrome-” Sowa used this notion to refer to the 
“struggles with the form” as a central motif of Polish culture:  
the difficulty, or even impossibility, of shaping the most general frames of so-
cial life in a way which would allow adaptation to the requirements of the age 
and to catch up with the main drivers of modernization […] and, on the other 
hand, somehow to express oneself. (Sowa 2011, 31)  
This understanding would be akin to my own but for the fact that, for Sowa, the 
peripheral status of Poland was of key explanatory importance, whereas for me 
the pivotal issue is not the “real” status of the land, but the status designed and 
projected by way of a national habitus, which may be fantastic, falsely locating 
the “self” to be expressed. Moreover, the struggles with the form are not just a 
problem of peripheral, colonized nations: they may also affect the central colo-
nial powers, a notion for which Brexit is arguably an excellent recent argument 
(Bhambra and Narayan 2016). Postcolonial syndrome is not always peripheral, 
and not always reality-congruent, especially if it is politically instrumentalized.  
Another author who referred to the “postcolonial syndrome” among the 
Polish intelligentsia was Tomasz Zarycki (2014). However, my use of this term 
significantly diverges from Zarycki’s, and not simply because my subject is not 
the intelligentsia, even though the proponents of national habitus which I ana-
lyze in this article often belong to this group. The difference between Zarycki’s 
approach and my own consists in my focus on the application of postcolonial 
framing to the construction of national habitus in its inclusive and exclusive, 
internal and external uses. Zarycki’s intelligentsia developed a postcolonial 
syndrome as a reply to being excluded or, more likely, self-excluded from the 
national community. Therefore, I would argue that Zarycki’s narrative starts 
too late in the process: it misses the point where the process of the intelligent-
sia’s exclusion was first set in motion by work on symbols and memories. 
Identifying that key moment in time would, however, move us back too far 
from the subject.  
My interest lies in the debates around Poland’s colonial and postcolonial sta-
tus in the past. It is my goal to explain why the habitus framed by postcolonial 
thinking can be successful in Poland today in terms of its synergy with symbol-
ic resources politically mobilized to fit the postcolonial frame including, in 
particular, the Catholic resources. For this political mobilization, the conver-
gence of two ideals: authenticity and autonomy, seem of decisive importance. 
Sowa insisted that cultural dependency of postcolonial societies expresses 
itself in their “inability autonomically to shape their own habitus” (Sowa 2011, 
434). He thus agreed with the advocates of postcolonial framing on the Right 
insisting that the authenticity of a national group should express itself in its 
autonomy of self-creation. This autonomy was allegedly denied to Poland by 
the West. Poland (or, more precisely, Polish culture) was “orientalized, deni-
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grated and devalued.” which resulted in an inauthentic culture, foreign in terms 
of form and empty in terms of content, driven by the “‘elites’ [which] suppos-
edly deny the native soil from which they have sprung, always looking to 
Western Europe and the United States for cultural, political and artistic models 
to follow, disdaining everything naturally ‘Polish’ as inferior” (Bill 2014, 3).  
This very apt summary underscores the importance of the recent past for the 
development of this particular form of postcolonialism. The systemic transfor-
mation may have given Poland a new elite, and the mentality of this elite may 
well have been marked by subservience to the West (cf. Thompson 2007; 
2011). The transformation would be an act of colonization by Western ideas of 
modernity and social development, which the agents of transformation translat-
ed into the hierarchy of aspirations of Polish society. These agents not only 
transplanted Western institutional, legal, and economic solutions into Polish 
soil, but they also naturalized them as “normality” (a buzzword in liberal dis-
course of the late 1980s and 1990s, cf. Waśkiewicz 2015). Although it is per-
fectly plausible to aspire to normality by becoming integrated into a larger unit 
(such as the West or, more specifically, the European Union) this poses a ques-
tion of autonomy and of the authenticity of the normality achieved. Becoming 
“like the West” was yet another effort to teach Polish society to be something 
other than it was. I refer to this as “liberal pedagogy” (Bucholc 2018b, Bucholc 
forthcoming). In Poland after 1989, it was part of a utopian project of social 
engineering (Szacki 1995, 149). Support for liberalism did not last, nor did 
support for liberal forms. From 2015 onwards, they were debunked as inau-
thentic and not autonomous. The debunking was applied to the rule of law and 
liberal democracy as well (see Bucholc 2019). The current Polish Right rein-
terprets the Polish experience of modernity and, in particular, the period of 
democratic transformation after 1989, as times of colonization by foreign pow-
ers, interests, ideas, and institutions. The essentialized “Polish Nation” has 
allegedly resisted these attempts and preserved its integrity, so that it could 
finally be politically articulated in a fully autonomous way. Revitalization of 
the ideas of state sovereignty, national unity, and cultural uniformity, largely 
dissolved in liberal discourses, stem from the need to draw a clear dividing line 
between the colonizers and the colonized, to empower the latter and eliminate 
the postcolonial mentality represented by the opponents of the governing party. 
Internal and external needs are thus served.  
This, of course, turns the Polish Right into a postcolonial elite, engaged bus-
ily in a struggle against the agents of colonialism. The governing PiS seeks to 
emancipate itself and its country from any form of historically evidenced im-
posed inauthenticity, equating the communist with the liberal, the Eastern 
(Russian) with the Western (German), and interdependence with dependence. 
Double binds are all too evident here: dealing with imported categories and 
concepts by way of other imported Western inventions, such as state sovereign-
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ty, nationalism and Catholicism as the core of national value system. But there 
is no such thing as an autonomously forged habitus.  
The divergence of the imagery used by the Right and the work on symbols 
in Rosary to the Borders is striking and paradoxical: the national-conservative 
government of Poland invests disproportionate energy in a politics of memory 
and historical politics. If one common denominator in all this politics could be 
named, it is restoration of national glory. In the rhetoric of the current govern-
ing party, a few recurrent phrases express this intention (Bucholc and Komor-
nik 2016; Bucholc 2018a; 2019; Sadurski 2018). Two among them are particu-
larly apt: “getting up from our knees” (wstać z kolan) and “pedagogy of 
shame” (pedagogika wstydu). Kneeling is a typically Christian practice of 
unequivocally positive meaning: it is a pose of prayer. Shame, especially of one 
own misdeeds, is also a Christian sentiment, a correlate of guilt, leading to 
apology, repentance, and (hopefully) forgiveness. Nevertheless, by admitting 
shame and asking for forgiveness one admits one’s own weakness and depend-
ence on other’s mercy. It can be embarrassing if the penitent is a nation-state 
and the mercy is requested of another nation state or a supranational organiza-
tion.  
In the Rosary to the Borders, the call to “raise the heads” (Podnieście… 
2017) was meaningfully built into this theological nexus because of the intrin-
sic link between the Rosary and the Great Atonement a year before. People 
who repented as a national group were called upon to raise their heads in de-
fense of their values, but without getting up from their knees: the defense also 
took on a form of a prayer. However, this part of religious framing would be 
blatantly inconsistent with the views of the Right: it argues for a defence of 
Catholic values without the readiness to kneel down which provides a theologi-
cal rationale for the defence. 
The notion of “pedagogy of shame” is a response to liberal pedagogy: the 
latter is debunked as a trick played by the postcolonial elite, successfully trying 
to force its own society to kneel down before its alleged Western betters. One 
way to accomplish it was to reveal the national past which was better left un-
discovered and forgotten. The cultural conflict around the issue of national 
guilt and atonement inevitably centred on the history of anti-Semitism in Po-
land. The direct trigger was the book of Jan Tomasz Gross about Poles mass 
murdering their Jewish neighbors in 1941 in Jedwabne (Gross 2001) and was 
later continued on a much smaller scale by Gross himself, and by authors such 
as (alphabetically) Andrzej Leder (2014), Jan Sowa (2011), Paweł Śpiewak 
(2005, 2012), Marcin Zaremba (2012), and others, discussing Polish-Jewish, 
Polish-Ukrainian, and Polish-German relations, usually their less glorious 
aspects. The movie industry kept pace, and some of the best Polish movies of 
recent decades are historical pictures in which the demons from national histo-
ry are unveiled – or obscured.  
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In this work of memory, the advocates of “shame,” whether within or out-
side the academy, operate on the simple script: let us find out how it really was 
and tell it to the people, for the key value is the truth. To this, the advocates of 
national pride and glory respond with a denial of any truth which would show 
the national group in any light but the most favorable. This policy not only 
takes on a form of redirecting public funding (including in science) to congen-
ial activities, renaming streets and organizing coordinated mass-scale public 
celebrations of events and figures of the past relived through the government 
propaganda (Bucholc 2018a). It is also accompanied by legislative means. The 
aforementioned “Polish Holocaust Law” of 26 January 2018 criminalizing any 
allegations of Polish participation in the Holocaust was a part of the same pro-
ject to abolish the “pedagogy of shame” once and for all (Bucholc and Komor-
nik 2018; Gliszczyńska-Grabias and Kozłowski 2018). Reconciliation with 
Israel was finally achieved by the Polish government in June 2018 after diplo-
matic havoc involving the USA. This was presented to society not as a com-
promise or an act of repentance, but as a victory of Polish raison d’état, another 
proof that Poland was raising from its knees (Bucholc 2019). 
7.  Conclusion: National Habitus and Social Integration 
The national habitus whose Catholic roots and postcolonial framing I explored 
in this article is currently used as a powerful political instrument, capable of 
mobilizing up to 40% of Polish voters in support of the Right which has been 
in in power more than three years. That period has been marked by democratic 
backsliding, dismantling of the rule of law, international tensions unprecedent-
ed in Poland’s history after 1989, recurrent waves of social protest, unparal-
leled decline in the level of public debate, and lack of security in many sectors 
of public and private life. An analysis of symbolic resources used in the action 
“Rosary to the Borders” allows us to identify the connection between Catholi-
cism and Polish national habitus advocated by the currently government. The 
source of strength of this habitus is not only a skillful use of symbolic resources 
related to national history, but also a bricolage of symbols drawn from Catholic 
resources, both common to all believers and the country-specific ones.  
The function of the habitus which includes all these resources is twofold: to 
keep the outsiders at bay but it is also used to eliminate internal others. Internal 
and external uses of national habitus are framed by postcolonial categories, 
which results in the focus on dependency, sovereignty, authenticity, and auton-
omy. The quest for authenticity resulting from the postcolonial syndrome of the 
Polish Right is extended to the whole state-society of Poland of today, not only 
by religious, but also by purely political means, directed against the “pedagogy 
of shame” as a part of the pedagogy of transformational liberalism. Intensive 
work on symbols is taking place in Polish educational institution, in politics, in 
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the judiciary, and in the legislature. It is set on bringing some symbols back and 
re-charging them emotionally, but also on fostering forgetfulness.  
In the figurational dimension, a direct effect of the habitus design which I 
have analyzed in this article is first and foremost an increased likelihood that 
the network of interdependencies between Poland and other countries be dis-
rupted. Even though the so-called “Polexit” remains a journalistic pun, there is 
a likelihood of Poland being effectively excluded from the European communi-
ty. Instead of a well-integrated country, Poland would then become a loose 
satellite of the EU, a state-society with a postcolonial problem. In the lay ra-
tionalizing of Rosary to the Borders, if not in its theological dimension, we 
essentially discover the idea that strength and power can come either from God 
or from inside the national group. For a sociologist of a Durkhemian persua-
sion, God is a sacralized society, and if the society in question is devised as a 
homogenous national group, its habitus is reduced to narcissistic self-idolatry, a 
dangerous idea changing the nationalized work on symbols into a kind of emo-
tional perpetuum mobile.  
From an Eliasian point of view, one last remark must be made. Rosary to the 
Borders is a synecdoche, a figure of speech representing the national habitus, 
and at its core is fear. Rosary to the Borders was apotropaic, warding off evil, 
and defensive, not offensive and aggressive. It was also retrospective and re-
storative, for it looked towards the vanishing borders to resuscitate them by a 
powerful religious fantasy. It would be a mistake to understand this act as a 
prideful self-affirmation. Rather, it is a proof of the unsurpassed persistence of 
yet another emotionally-loaded symbol omnipresent in Polish history: the fear 
that Poland may be lost after all, contrary to the first words of Polish national 
anthem, probably the only meaningful sequence of words in Polish ever memo-
rized by Norbert Elias (Gleichmann 2006, 294). 
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